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1 However, there are a large
number of possible models of
compensation, as nicely out-
lined in the review of Ritter and
Taylor (1997).
2 See the Data Appendix for the
exact question pertaining to
pay-for-performance in the
NLSY.
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T
his paper explores some of the deter-
minants of compensation in the United
States.  We suggest that compensation
systems should be viewed as an integral
part of the production process.  We also
wish to highlight the diversity in observed
systems of pay that is often overlooked
when examining wage trends from a
macroeconomic perspective.1 A goal of
the work reviewed here is to introduce
compensation models that make predic-
tions based upon observed job characteris-
tics, and illustrate how compensation form
may respond to changes in both the nature
of work and labor-market conditions.
The extent to which we are able to relate
compensation to job characteristics is very
much limited by the data.  Fortunately, avail-
able data sets do have some information that
we can use.  In this essay we use both the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY)
and the Panel Study on Income Dynamics
(PSID) to explore these issues.  These data
are not perfect, but they do provide infor-
mation on some quite distinctive compen-
sation practices.  Table 1 reports the
incidence of pay method by occupation for
the NLSY.  Workers were asked if during
the current year they received any of the
following types of compensation:
1. Hourly:  Pay that depends upon the 
number of hours worked.
2. Salary:  Pay by ﬁxed period, such as 
weekly, monthly or yearly.  Hours of 
work may vary from pay period to 
pay period, with no corresponding 
change in salary.  
3. Piece Rate:  Payment based upon the
number of pieces produced by the 
worker, typically a supplement to 
hourly pay.  For the PSID, workers are
also asked if they are paid a combi-
nation consisting of an hourly rate 
and a piece rate.
4. Commission:  Pay based upon some 
dollar measure of output, such as 
sales in the last period, typically  
commissions supplement salary pay.  
For the PSID, workers are also asked
if they are paid a combination con-
sisting of a salary and commission.
5. Bonus:  Pay above one’s salary or 
hourly pay that is not contractually 
linked to a measure of performance, 
and hence its level is at the discretion
of the employer.
6. Promotion:  Movement to a higher 
rank, usually, though not always, 
associated with greater pay.2
This list does not exhaust the types of
pay that we observe in practice, though it
does move beyond the types of pay that
would be considered in most macroeconomic
models.  In the next section, we brieﬂy review
the standard agency model.  This model,
the starting point for the economic theory
of contracts, helps us understand the 
conditions under which a ﬁrm should 
link measures of performance to pay.  As
Table 1 illustrates, however, explicit pay-
for-performance contracts are by no means
ubiquitous.  In a later section entitled
“Opportunism and Contract Complexity,”
we will explore the limitations of the agency
model in the context of Williamson’s (1975)
concept of opportunism.
When the employment relation is com-
plex, then pay-for-performance contracts
are incomplete, and hence workers may
engage in inefﬁcient opportunistic behavior.
A solution to this problem, discussed in a
section entitled “Relational Contracts,” is
to use a relational contract that delays
specifying rewards and exact performance
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3 See Hart and Holmstrom
(1987) for a good overview of
the agency model.  See also
Gibbons (1995) for a more up-
to-date review of this literature.
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expectations until after the worker has
selected effort.  Under the appropriate con-
ditions, this provides a solution to the
problem of opportunistic behavior.  More-
over, it has the empirical prediction that
ﬁrms are more likely to use bonus pay
rather than efﬁciency wages when labor
markets are tight.  We test and ﬁnd some
support for this hypothesis.  The ﬁnal section
of the paper contains concluding remarks.
AGENCY THEORY
The agency model begins with a prin-
cipal who wishes to hire an agent to carry
out a task, usually involving the assets
owned by the principal.3 There are three
basic ingredients in such a model:
1. The agent is risk averse.
2. The output of the agent is a 
stochastic function of effort.
3. The agent’s effort is imperfectly 
observable.
For simplicity, assume that the principal
is risk neutral, given that the agent is risk
averse, this implies that the individual
would prefer to receive a ﬁxed income
stream that is independent of the project’s
fortunes.  Given that effort is not easily
observable, however, this may give rise to
moral hazard:  The agent may choose less
than the efﬁcient level of effort.  The prin-
Pay Method by Occupation
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) 1988-90
Occupation  Hourly  Salary  Piece Rate  Commission  Bonus  Promotion
Managers and admin.except farm  19.98%  80.02%  0.68%  9.84%  28.46%  18.91%
Writers, artists, etc.  21.84%  78.16%  2.30%  9.20%  17.24%  14.94%
Sales workers  25.07%  74.94%  0.78%  37.98%  25.58%  11.37%
Prof., tech, except eng. techn.  27.94%  72.06%  0.43%  1.99%  15.46%  13.76%
Personal service workers  36.81%  63.19%  1.84%  20.25%  9.20%  9.82%
Secretaries  37.20%  62.80%  1.02%  1.37%  11.60%  13.99%
Engineering and science techn.  42.37%  57.63%  0.00%  5.09%  9.32%  18.64%
Clerical and unskilled 1*  43.18%  56.83%  1.34%  3.12%  13.21%  16.32%
Ofﬁce machine operators  43.88%  56.12%  0.84%  1.27%  13.50%  14.77%
Clerical and unskilled 2**  48.76%  51.24%  1.99%  1.74%  10.20%  14.93%
Transport equip. operatives  50.48%  49.52%  3.38%  8.21%  13.53%  10.14%
Food service workers  52.46%  47.55%  0.52%  1.29%  7.49%  11.37%
Mechanics and repairmen  53.16%  46.84%  4.54%  9.56%  9.89%  12.16%
Cleaning service workers  54.46%  45.55%  1.49%  0.50%  7.43%  9.90%
Craftsmen and kindred 1***  60.32%  39.68%  2.67%  1.60%  10.68%  17.97%
Precision machine operatives  60.44%  39.56%  36.81%  1.10%  9.34%  10.44%
Laborers, except farm  60.71%  39.29%  6.02%  1.88%  10.34%  13.16%
Health service workers  65.99%  34.01%  2.03%  0.51%  8.63%  9.65%
Textile operators  66.67%  33.33%  9.76%  0.71%  11.43%  10.00%
Operatives exc. precis. machines
and textile  68.93%  31.07%  8.75%  1.79%  10.54%  7.32%
* From bank tellers to meter readers for utilities (Census 301 to 334)
**From shipping clerks to ticket agents and other miscellaneous clerks (Census 374 to 395)
***From auto accessory installers to machinist apprentices (Census 401 to 462)
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4 This is the so-called full-sup-
port assumption that is a neces-
sary (though not sufﬁcient)
condition to use the ﬁrst-order
approach to characterize the
optimum.  Harris and Raviv
(1979) show that if the sup-
port moves with effort then one
can implement the ﬁrst best.
We also assume that the densi-
ty is a differentiable function of
y and m.
5 See Holmstrom (1982) for
more details.
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cipal can provide incentives for performance
by making the agent’s pay conditional
upon the available performance measures.
More formally, suppose that the agent’s
preferences are given by:
(1)
where wis income and e [{L,H} is low or
high effort.  The utility for income is assumed
to be twice differentiable, and satisfy
for every w >0.  The
disutility for effort satisﬁes u H>u L>0.  The
effort of the agent results in a stochastic
output denominated in dollars, y e Y # R,
as well as a vector of performancemeasures,
m = {m1,...,mn} e M.  Let fe(y,m) denote the
joint distribution of y and m as a function
of effort, where it is assumed that fe(y,m) >
0 for all (y,m)[Y´M.4 Let us further sup-
pose that it is efﬁcient for the agent to
produce a high level of effort (otherwise
the problem is trivial), and that the
principal offers a wage contract that is a
function of the observable signals (y,m),
given by w+ c(y,m).
In this case the principal agent







Constraint 3 is the individual rationality
constraint that ensures the agent receives
as much as his or her next best alternative,
denoted U
–-
.  The next constraint, 4, is the
incentive constraint that ensures that the
agent prefers to work hard rather than to shirk.
Notice that even though the principal
cannot directly observe the actions of the
agent, the contract is designed so that in
equilibrium the agent chooses to work
hard.  Assuming that the solution can be
characterized by the ﬁrst order conditions
for the optimum, then the optimal
contract solves the following equation:
(5) ,
where m , l  ³ 0 are the LaGrange multipliers
associated with constraints 3 and 4,
respectively.  If there were no moral hazard
problem, then constraint 4 would not be
binding, and l=0 with the optimal





The interesting case is when moral
hazard is a problem, and l>0.  In that case,
the sensitivity of the contract to y and m
depends upon the behavior of the
likelihood ratio  .  When
the likelihood ratio is a decreasing function
of y, called the monotone likelihood ratio
condition, then the optimal contract will be
increasing in y.  This condition implies that
FH ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates FL
(though the converse is not true).  As
discussed in detail by Hart and Holmstrom
(1987), the intuition is that a high y signals
high effort, and the agent should receive a
greater reward.  In equilibrium the principal
has correct expectations concerning worker
effort, and the signaling effect is to provide
ex ante incentives, and does not provide
information to the principal per se.  The sig-
naling perspective does provide guidance
about when additional measures of perfor-
mance should be incorporated into the
optimal contract, as shown in the following
proposition.5
Proposition 1. Suppose that the solution
to the principal agent problem satisﬁes the
ﬁrst-order condition 5, then the optimal con-
tract c*(y,m) depends upon the signal mi
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6 We use a linear probability
model rather than a logit or
probit because we can better
control for selection effects and
misclassiﬁcation error.  The
main drawback of a linear prob-
ability model is that it is less
efﬁcient, but in general it is
more robust to speciﬁcation
errors than a nonlinear model
would be.  Note also that the
standard errors are adjusted 
for group effects (see e.g.,
Moulton, 1986) and that we
take into account possible
selection (into occupation)
effects.  See MacLeod and
Parent (1997) for complete
details.
7 To correct for misclassiﬁcation
error, we borrow from Krueger
and Summers (1988).
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For example, if mi represents the clothes
of the agent or their hairstyle, and these
provide no information concerning their
effort, then they should not enter into the
optimal contract.  Any other measures,
however, such as customer complaints,
supervisor reports, etc., that provide 
additional information concerning perfor-
mance above and beyond y should be
included in the optimal contract, even if
the contract already depends upon y.
Consider for example a sales person
who is paid on commission.  Sales is a dis-
crete variable that depends upon a number
of factors, including price, buyer preferences,
store location, etc.  Hence a sale may be
made even if a salesperson is rude (for
example, the buyers had to purchase the
good immediately and could not search
further).  Rudeness, however, is likely to
affect the probability of a sale in many
cases.  Even if the sale is consummated,
the optimal contract would entail a penalty
if the customers report to the manager that
the salesperson is rude.  The model
predicts that even a single report of rude-
ness should generate a negative ﬁnancial
consequence, and more generally, as Gib-
bons (1995) observes, agency theory
generically predicts a sensitivity to
available performance measures that we
rarely observe in practice.
Some Evidence
To understand why performance-pay
contracts are not ubiquitous, we begin by
looking at some of the determinants of
performance pay.  Even if agency theory 
is not a complete model, it still provides
important insights into the necessary 
conditions for the use of a performance
measure.  In particular, jobs for which 
the cost of obtaining good measures are
low should have a higher incidence of per-
formance pay.  As we can see from Table 1,
we have data from the NLSY that describes
certain types of performance pay during
the 1988-90 period.  Unfortunately, no
questions pertaining to the characteristics
of the jobs were asked in the NLSY during
the 1988-90 period.  But such questions
were asked in 1979 and 1982, which we
can use to carry out a preliminary investi-
gation of the relationship between
performance pay and job characteristics.
The relevant question in those years was:
“We would like to know what kind of
opportunities this job offers you.  How
much opportunity does this job give you?
A minimum amount, not too much, a
moderate amount, quite a lot, or a
maximum amount? 
1. To do a number of things (variety).
2. Deal with people.
3. For independent thought or action 
(autonomy).
4. Friendships.
5. To do a job from beginning to end 
(probe if necessary: that is, the 
chance to do the whole job) 
(complete TASK).”
Answers are re-coded to zero if respon-
dents answer either “a minimum amount,
not too much, or a moderate amount,” while
they are re-coded to one if respondents
answered either one of the last two possibil-
ities. For each one of 20 occupation cells,
we compute the average of the answers in
both the 1979 and the 1982 surveys.  
We then merge these averages to each cor-
responding occupation category for the
1988-90 period.  This, of course, is a crude
way to proxy the different dimensions of the
jobs, but we think that it is not too unrea-
sonable to assume that jobs that are in the
same occupation cell may share some
common characteristics. 
In Table 2 we report the results from a
linear probability model of different types
of performance pay.6 Given that piece rate
workers also are categorized as wage earners
(notice that all workers are categorized as
either wage or salary workers), then we can
ask what job characteristics are associated
with the use of piece rates.  These results
are reported in the ﬁrst two columns, with
the second column correcting for biases
that may be introduced due to misclassiﬁ-
cation of worker occupation.7
Notice that requiring workers to perform
complete tasks is negatively related to the
use of piece rates.  This may suggest that
individuals on straight wages are morelikely to be assigned speciﬁc tasks, with
target completion dates, this is consistent
with our view that a worker is paid a ﬁxed
hourly wage but does not imply a lack of
incentive pay.  Rather, the worker is paid
for the time spent on the job, where he or
she is required to achieve a satisfactory
level of performance.  Relative to piece-
rate contracts, tasks with less variety
would be easier to monitor on a day-to-day
basis, hence performance can be measured
in terms of acceptable/unacceptable, with
termination being the consequence if there
is unacceptable performance.
The Autonomy variable has positive
sign in the Commission vs. Fixed-Salary
regression, while the complete task
variable is negative.  Given that commission
workers are rewarded based upon a measure
of output, direct monitoring is less neces-
sary and hence they have more autonomy.
This also implies that those workers who
are not paid commissions would be more
closely monitored, an observation that is
consistent with the negative coefﬁcient for
the Complete Task variable.
Consistent with earlier results by
Brown (1990), we ﬁnd that Variety has a
negative effect on the likelihood that com-
mission contracts are used.  This result
does not follow directly from the agency
theory that would predict the use of more,
not less, performance pay.  In the next sec-
tion we outline a model based upon
MAY/JUNE  1999
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Table 2
The Effect of Job Attribute on the Likelihood of a Compensation
Characteristic Based upon the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth (NLSY) (1988-90)
Is the following Piece Rate(1) Commission (1) Bonus + Salary (1)
attribute important vs. vs. vs.
in your job? Hourly Wage (0) Salary and/or Salary + Termin.
Bonus Pay (0) Contract (0)
Autonomy -0.1331 -0.1835 1.5634 2.2259 0.982 1.1825
(0.5382) (0.3536) (0.4433) (0.5464) -0.9165 -0.5275
Complete Task -1.4971 -1.4102 -0.7975 -1.2647 0.3077 -0.4598
(0.6352) (0.4173) (0.5231) (0.5960) (0.9044) (0.6226)
Variety 0.9406 0.6816 -1.1221 -1.156 -1.1146 -0.5263
(0.4795) (0.3451) (0.3949) (0.4429) (0.7175) (0.4700)
Friendships -0.5213 -0.0419 -0.3344 -0.5861 -0.3302 -0.6134
(0.6105) (0.4029) (0.5052) (0.6794) (1.2908) (0.6012)
Deal with People -0.0435 0.0611 0.2367 0.1735 0.1426 0.4136
(0.1921) (0.1262) (0.1582) (0.3429) (0.2593) (0.1883)
Correction for No Yes No Yes No Yes
Misclassiﬁcation?
F-Test of No Selection
(P-Value) 0.0878 0.2599 0.7084
Sample Size 3927 3927 4238 4238 3832 3832
Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses, with 5 percent signiﬁcance given in white, and 1 percent signiﬁcance in grey.  These are
adjusted for structural group effects where applicable. Other covariates include tenure, labor market experience, and dummies for
region, industry, year, residence in Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA), unemployment rate, schooling, union status, and
increase in responsibility.Williamson’s (1975) notion of opportunism,
which may help explain this effect.  It is
also interesting to observe that job charac-
teristics have little impact upon the choice
of whether to use bonus pay.  
If bonus pay is not directly related to job
characteristics, then what is its role?  The
use of bonus pay is not a prediction of the
agency model because it is not an explicit
function of a performance measure, rather
it is the consequence of some subjective
performance-evaluation system.  More
generally, the data also suggests that for
many workers, contracted-performance pay
(piece rate or commission) is not always
an important ingredient of compensation,
especially when Variety is important—
even though agency theory predicts that
even imperfect measures of performance
should be incorporated into pay.  In the
next section we discuss how a model of
contract incompleteness based upon a
simple complexity argument can explain
both the use of noncontingent pay and
why the incidence of bonus pay may not
depend upon job characteristics.
OPPORTUNISM AND  
CONTRACT COMPLEXITY
What we learn from the agency model
is that generically optimal contracts should
incorporate all available performance mea-
sures.  This implies that pay-for-perfor-
mance should be the norm rather than the
exception.  There is a large body of evi-
dence in the management literature that
emphasizes the dysfunctional attributes of
performance pay.  For example, if we were
to reward computer programmers based
upon the number of lines of code that they
produce, then the likely consequence is
not necessarily high output, but many
lines of inefﬁcient and error-ridden code.
An immediate response is that lines of
code is not an appropriate measure of
output.  As the famous study by Kerr
(1975) eloquently illustrates, many organi-
zations and ﬁrms have implemented
pay-for-performance systems, only later to
discover that they result in dysfunctional
behavior from the organization’s point of
view.  Recall that in an agency model 
the optimal contract incorporates the
incentives for shirking via the Incentive-
Compatibility constraint, and thus, ﬁrms
would never be surprised by worker
behavior ex ante.  Kerr’s observation of
unexpected, dysfunctional behavior ex post
is consistent with Williamson’s (1975)
notion of opportunism:  self-interest
seeking with guile.
In the context of an agency
relationship, we deﬁne guile as behavior
that takes advantage of the incentive system
by increasing the agent’s payoff at the
expense of the principals that is not antici-
pated via the Incentive Constraint.  For
example, consider a ﬁrm that rewards typ-
ists based upon the measured number of
keystrokes per day.  This is a clear pay-for-
performance contract committing the ﬁrm
to a pay method that is a simple function of
“output.”  The difﬁculty with this system,
as was discovered when the system was
implemented at one ﬁrm, is that one typist
discovered that she could increase her
income by pressing the same key repeatedly.  
Had the ﬁrm anticipated this behavior,
it would have implemented additional
monitoring to ensure the quality of output.
The agency model explicitly assumes that
all possible types of dysfunctional behavior
are anticipated and controlled with the
appropriate contract terms and conditions.
Hence, the introduction of a negative
behavior such as guile necessarily requires
the relaxation of the complete-contracts
assumption, which in turn requires a fun-
damental modiﬁcation of the standard
economic model of decision-making.8
The conceptual starting point is to view
contract incompleteness as arising from the
problem of exchanging complex goods, such
as labor services.  A distinguishing feature of
a complex good, relative to an exchange of
a simple good or commodity, is that quality
is difﬁcult to deﬁne, and therefore difﬁcult to
enforce using a contingent contract enforced
by the threat of a court action.  Secondly, both
the creation of complex goods and the forma-
tion of contracts to govern their exchange
are innovative activities that do not ﬁt easily
into the standard agency model.  
8 See MacLeod (1997) for a
complete discussion of this
point.
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with a simple model of employment based
upon the multitasking model of Holmstrom
and Milgrom (1991): 
1. The principal and agent agree on 
compensation and expectations for 
performance (which may include 
the continuation of a previous 
agreement).
2. The state of the world 
is revealed.
3. The agent divides a time endowment 
of Y among k different tasks:  .
4. The principle pays the agent Wt.
5.  Both principle and agent decide 
whether to continue the relationship 
or not.
The date is denoted by the subscript t,
and K is the number of possible tasks.  The
twist upon the previous literature concerns
the interpretation of the state of nature.
Suppose that both the costs and beneﬁts of
different actions are unknown ex ante; for
example, a ﬁreman may not know which
house will catch ﬁre; how difﬁcult it will be
to put out the ﬁre; nor is he able to antici-
pate the set of actions that will need to be
carried out upon entering the burning
house.  A state space that incorporates
uncertain costs and beneﬁts for each of the
possible tasks can be deﬁned as follows:
(6)
where 
denotes one of n levels of productivity for
task k, while
represents one of the m cost levels for task
k.  The total beneﬁt from an effort choice
yt is deﬁned by a
Tyt (boldface represents a
vector), while the total cost to the worker
of producing this effort is 
(7)
The quadratic term implies that the marginal
cost of effort in a single task is increasing
with effort, ensuring an interior optimum.
The function d(yit) is 1 if yit is positive and
zero otherwise, which implies that there is
a ﬁxed cost f of supplying a positive level
of effort to a particular task.  When there
are a large number of tasks this implies
that the individual will supply effort to
only a subset of possible tasks.
The beneﬁts and costs have been modeled
as functions, however it is explicitly assumed
that a measurement system does not exist.
Consider a secretary who carries out a variety
of tasks including typing, answering the
phone, ﬁling, making travel reservations, etc.
The costs and beneﬁts for these different
activities vary with the day-to-day demands
of the ofﬁce.  For example, several people
in the ofﬁce may need to go to the same
conference, raising the productivity of allo-
cating time to travel plans, and resulting in
a cutback in typing throughput.  On the
cost side, if the conference occurs during a
busy period (for example college convocation),
then one may have to call several hotels to
ﬁnd accommodations.  Not only do these
costs and beneﬁts vary in an independent
way from day-to-day, it is not clear (at least
to me) how one would construct a measure-
ment system to directly compare the costs
and beneﬁts of the different actions.
Notice that in the principal agent model
it assumed that all signals, m, are veriﬁable
and can be used to construct an explicit
contract; however the yit are assumed to not
be measurable.  Here, we suppose that the 
yit can be observed, but there exists no
contractible m.  For example, if one had a
measure of individual contribution,
this could be used to construct
an efﬁcient, explicit contract.  For many, if
not most jobs, it is very difﬁcult to construct
such a measure.  
The lack of a measurement system
aggregating performance implies that the
contract must explicitly describe each state
and specify the appropriate associated
action.9 This is common in many contracts.
For example, the contract for a singer at a
concert may explicitly list acceptable rea-
sons, such as laryngitis, that excuse the
mt
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9 This assumption can be con-
trasted with the agency
approach to compensation as
outlined in Baker (1992) and
Holmstrom and Milgrom
(1991).  This work examines
the optimal way to incorporate
imperfect signals of worker per-
formance into the pay package.
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19individual from providing the contracted
upon services.  Formally the contract is a
function 
where for each state w  eW ,  the
deﬁnes the wage payment and the output
expected from the agent.  This assumption
differs from the incomplete contracts liter-
ature where it is assumed that such a
contract is impossible, while maintaining
the hypothesis that individuals understand
all the possible outcomes and can recontract
based on the ex post  realization of the state.
For this model an efﬁcient complete
contract,
is the solution to the following program:
(8) 
subject  to:





is the one-period alternative utility
for the worker.  Following Townsend (1979)
and Dye (1985), let us suppose that there
is a cost for including additional contract
contingencies, given by g  per contingency.
For this multitasking model one has the
following result.
Proposition 2.  The cost of implementing
the complete contract procedure when 




What is important to observe is that the
cost of the contract is an exponential func-
tion of the number of tasks.  The literature
on computational complexity emphasizes
the impossibility of implementing algorithms
whose costs are exponential in the size of
the problem (see Garey and Johnson, 1979).
To see why this is the case, suppose that 
g   =  1 cent, and that the number of cost and
performance levels are the same (n  = m).
Table 3 presents the costs of the complete
contract as a function of the number of
tasks and effort levels.
As one can see, the use of a complete
contract when there are more than say 10
tasks is impossible.  Furthermore, given
that these costs reﬂect the number of
underlying states, dynamic programming
is impossible because one could not com-
pute the expected value of the relationship.
Observe that the piece rate contracts 
correspond to basing compensation on 
one dimension of output.  In this simple w  U  C wwb ()=+() () y  ,  ,
y  º¢= ∑
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Cost of a Complete-State Contingent Contract
Number of Tasks
Number of Cost and
Performance Levels  2  5  10  15
2  $0.16  $10  $10,000  $10 million
3  $0.81  $600  $35 million  $2 trillion
4  $2.56  $10,000  $11 billion  $11,000 trillion
5  $6.25  $100,000  $1,000 billion  $10 million trillion
Cost of a contract clause:  1 cent
Table 3setup complete contracts are very inexpen-
sive; therefore, they should be observed
when there is a small number of tasks to
be measured.
A solution to the problem of
complexity is to use an ex post  evaluation
of the employee using supervisor reports.
The subjective nature of these reports
make third-party enforcement impossible.
Hence, performance depends upon what
MacNeil (1974) calls a relational contract,
which is discussed in more detail in the
next section.  Given that direct supervision
of the employee is an essential ingredient
of the relational contract, then not only
should workers in such contracts have 
less autonomy, but they also should have
well-deﬁned goals that are determined
by their supervisors.
RELATIONAL CONTRACTS
When an explicit contract is not pos-
sible, the ﬁrm must rely upon some form
of ex post incentive to ensure performance.
There are essentially three types of
noncontracted ex post rewards that we
observe in the NLSY:
1. Termination contracts—pay the 
worker a ﬁxed salary, and ﬁre the 
worker at the end of the period if 
performance is not satisfactory.
2. Bonus contract—pay the worker a 
discretionary bonus at the end of 
the period that depends on 
performance.
3. Deferred compensation—reward the 
worker with a promotion or perma-
nent wage increase.
Bonus pay and deferred compensation
are not perfect substitutes since a promo-
tion entails a permanent increase in
income.  Given that we are using only
indicators rather than levels, however, we
have coded bonuses and deferred compen-
sation into the same category.  This
reduces the error associated with imputing
the true value of the promotion.  Between
10 percent to 14 percent of the individuals
in our data set receive some form of bonus
pay (as opposed to piece rates or commis-
sions, which are forms of complete
contingent contract with no ex post evalua-
tion).10 The theory developed in MacLeod
and Malcomson (1989) makes some
predictions concerning the effect of market
alternatives for workers upon the
incidence of bonus pay that we brieﬂy out-
line here.
Suppose the employment contract is
given by c={w,b}, where w is a ﬁxed wage
that is paid at the end of the period regard-
less of performance, and b ³ 0 is a
discretionary bonus payment that depends
on the ﬁrm’s subjective ex post evaluation
of performance.  Given this contract, indi-
vidual utility and ﬁrm proﬁts are given by:
(11)
(12)
where e [{0,1} is a noncontractible effort
choice taken by the worker, U
c and P
c are
the utility and proﬁt, respectively, from
continuing the relationship, assumed to be
discounted at the rate d .  The parameters u
and qare respectively the cost and beneﬁt
of one unit of effort.
The implicit agreement between the
ﬁrm and worker requires the ﬁrm to pay
the bonus if and only if the worker selects
the high level of effort.11 Should either
party shirk, then the relationship is termi-




denote the market alternatives for the
worker and the ﬁrm, then a contract is
self-enforcing if and only if the following
incentive conditions are satisﬁed: 
(13)
(14)
Notice that it is necessary to pay a bonus
only if d(Uc-U
–
) < v.  For example. if unem-
ployment rates for the worker were to
increase, this would lower U
–-
and increase
the likelihood that d(Uc-U
–
) ³  v.  In this case,
the threat of termination alone provides
sufﬁcient incentives for the worker not to
shirk.  Conversely, with a tight local labor
d P P
c b - ( ) ³ .
d u U U b
c - ( ) ³ - ,
P P c e w b
c ( ) = - - + q d ,
U c b e U
c ( )= + - + w u d ,
10Some individuals in the NLSY
data receive both piece rates
and bonuses.  They are a small
fraction of our sample, howev-
er, and so we do not explicitly
consider this case.
11MacLeod and Malcomson
(1989) prove that there is no
loss of generality when con-
tracts are restricted to take this
form.
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21market, when the worker can always 
ﬁnd alternative work easily, the incentive
constraints imply that some form of 
end-of-the-period bonus must be paid.
Therefore, we expect the incidence of
bonus pay to be a decreasing function of
the local unemployment rate.
In Table 4 we present some evidence
of this effect using the Panel Study on
Income Dynamics.  We also explore the
effect of both the local and industry unem-
ployment rates upon the amount of bonus
pay.  Table 5 shows the same relationship
regarding the incidence of bonuses/promo-
tions in the NLSY.  One explanation for
the incidence/amount-of-bonus pay is as a
form of proﬁt sharing between the ﬁrm
and the worker.  Most ﬁrm’s proﬁts are
correlated with industry rather than local
unemployment rates.  When this is the
case, it implies that bonus pay incidence
will increase with a decrease in the
industry unemployment rate, while the
local rate would be unimportant.  The self-
enforcing contract model makes the
opposite prediction.
As we can see from the regression
results, the industry rate is not signiﬁcant,
while the local unemployment rate has a
negative impact upon the amount and the
incidence of bonus pay.  Also, as we would
expect, this effect is stronger when we
restrict analysis to urban areas where
workers would have better market alterna-
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Tobit Analysis of Determinants of Bonus Pay
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (1984-91) $1979
(Standard Errors in Parenthesis)
Variable  All Observations  SMSA Workers Only
Local Unemployment Rate  -360.47  -357.2  -525.37  -570.49  -542.78  -893.73
(76.97)  (76.83)  (75.41)  (158.22)  (157.94)  (152.61)
Industry Unemployment Rate  -91.36  -125.58  -396.76  -36.86
(one-digit)  (328.33)  (77.96)  (598.02)  (133.36)
Schooling  186.98  200.69  -47.69  242.25  277.29  -6.64
(66.65)  (66.63)  (56.34)  (107.46)  (107.66)  (92.18)
Union  -1920.59  -2059.63  -1869.24  -2165.24  -2408.64  -2258.56
(554.94)  (548.56)  (559.72)  (982.56)  (970.28)  (995.49)
Potential Experience  -10.73  -11.6  -52.79  38.8  39.57  -9.38
(20.80)  (20.52)  (20.21)  (35.39)  (35.46)  (34.29)
Tenure  14.63  15.63  30.94  26.38  30.67  40.91
(26.12)  (25.69)  (26.20)  (44.00)  (43.00)  (44.16)
Live in a SMSA  571.09  657.22  347.53
(345.38)  (344.84)  (103.79)
Industry Dummies  Yes  No  Yes*  Yes  No  Yes*
Log Likelihood  -14116  -14124.2  -14113.6  -7724  -7733.5  -7721.6
N  10217  10217  10217  5119  5119  5119
Note:  Workers paid commissions are excluded from the analysis.  Additional regressors include time and occupation dummies, as well as
a dummy for being married.
*A full set of Year X Industry (one-digit) dummies.
Table 4tives.  More surprising for us, is the fact
that the local labor market effect increases
in the PSID data set when we add controls
for time-varying industry effects.  If bonus
pay were the result of proﬁt sharing, then
the addition of such controls would make
the effect of local unemployment either
small or less precise, whereas we observe
exactly the opposite.
In this model we have assumed that the
supervisor can perfectly observe performance
ex post.  We could add imperfect observability,
as in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), and obtain
the same result.  It is sometimes believed
that it is imperfect observability that gener-
ates an efﬁciency wage.  As the results of
Holmstrom (1982) demonstrate, however,
an imperfect but contractible  measure of
output would completely eliminate the equi-
librium unemployment result for a standard
efﬁciency wage model.  Hence, the use of
bonus pay and/or efﬁciency wages are a con-
sequence of increases in job complexity that
make it impossible to fully specify ex ante  an
employer’s performance expectations.  
Therefore, our results provide more
support for efﬁciency-wage type models.  In
the absence of bonus pay, an efﬁciency-
wage model implies that the wage must be
above market clearing, and if unemployment
falls this may lead to an increase in inﬂation.
Recently, the economy has appeared to have
both low inﬂation and low unemployment.
This could occur if ﬁrms move towards a
system of bonus pay, rather than raise
wages.  In Figure 1 we illustrate the trend in
the incidence of bonus pay, inﬂation, and
unemployment from 1976 until 1991.
While this is not a test, it does show a deﬁ-
nite upward trend in the use of bonus pay
during this period.
CONCLUSIONS
In this essay we have reviewed some
preliminary evidence relating job character-
istics  to the form of compensation.  Our
main message is that we observe a variety
of compensation systems used in practice,
the form of which depends upon job char-
acteristics.  There is no single economic
model of contract formation that can
explain the data.  Rather, the data suggests that
compensation systems depend on explicit
performance measures when these accurately
measure the contribution of work.  In
complex environments, ﬁrms must depend
upon subjective measures of performance
associated with ex post  rewards  to the worker.
We have also presented evidence showing
that the amount of bonus pay is dependent
upon the state of the local labor market.
One beneﬁt of bonus pay is that its level can
be adjusted easily from year-to-year in
response to business cycle ﬂuctuations,
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Deal with People 0.1426 0.4306
(0.2593) (0.2472)
Unemployment Rate -0.0774 -0.0321
in Local Labor Market (0.0161) (0.0159)
Unemployment Rate -0.0299 0.0123





Sample Size 3832 7682
Note:  Standard errors are in parentheses, with 5 percent signiﬁcance given in white, and 1
percent signiﬁcance in grey.  These are adjusted for structural group effects where applicable.
Other covariates include tenure, labor market experience, and dummies for region, industry,
year, residence in StandardMetropolitan Statistical Area, and increase in responsibility.which as Weitzman (1985) has argued, can
result in both low unemployment and low
inﬂation.  The recent trend increase in the
use of bonus pay may be one reason why
inﬂation has not increased, even though the
United States also is experiencing low
unemployment.
Currently, we do not know if this trend
is the consequence of secular changes in
the nature of work, or the result of innova-
tive activity on the part of the ﬁrm.  Given
that the form of compensation is likely to
affect the responsiveness of incomes to
inﬂation and business cycle ﬂuctuations, it
is important to better understand the rea-
sons for these changes.  We can conclude
that it is an oversimpliﬁcation to view wage
formation as the simple consequence of
supply and demand forces, and that better
understanding the source of variation in
pay systems may have important implica-
tions for the nature of monetary policy, a
question we hope to explore in future work.
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24DATA APPENDIX
National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth (1988-90)
The National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth (NLSY) data set surveyed 12,686
young males and females who were
between the ages of 14 and 21 in 1979.  In
1988, 1989, and 1990, respondents were
asked whether all or part of their earnings
were based on job performance.  They
were also asked a few questions on their
work environment.  For instance, we
know if the respondents were supervising
other employees and whether they had
received a promotion since their last inter-
view.  Unfortunately, we do not know the
precise dollar amounts of incentive pay
received by workers nor do we know the
proportion of their earnings which is due
to pay-for-performance.
We asked the following question 
pertaining to pay-for-performance:  “The
earnings on some jobs are based all or in
part on how a person performs the job
(hand card D).  On this card are some
examples of earnings that are based on job
performance.  Please tell me if any of the
earnings on your job (are/were) based on
any of these types of compensation.  Please
do not include proﬁt sharing or employee
stock purchase plans.
1.  Piece rates.
2.  Commissions.
3.  Bonuses (based on job
performance).
4.  Stock options.
5.  Tips.
6.  Other.”
They also were asked whether they 
had received a promotion on their current/
most recent job since the last interview.
We restricted the sample to individuals
who were in the labor market on a full-
time basis.  The people who were
considered as meeting that criterion 
were those:  
1.  Whose primary activity was either
working full-time, on a temporary
lay-off or looking actively for a job, 
2.  Who had worked at least half the
year since the last interview and
who were working at least 20
hours per week.
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Average Real Wage Change, NLSY 1988-90
No Promotion  Bonus  Promotion  Bonus and
No Bonus  Only  Only  Promotion
All Jobs  6.7%  7.6%  12.0%  11.6%
Within Existing Employment
Relationships Only  6.2%  7.2%  11.7%  3.8%
Incidence of Different Combinations, NLSY 1988-90
No Promotion  Bonus  Promotion  Bonus and
No Bonus  Only  Only  Promotion
All Jobs  72.3%  10.5%  13.5%  3.7%
First Time Observed
With Employer  72.7%  9.8%  13.7%  3.8%
Table 6Individuals excluded from the sample
were those who have been in the military
at any time, the self-employed, and all
public-sector employees.  These restrictions
left us with an unbalanced sample of 8,165
observations (3,847 workers), of which
3,832 were paid either a salary or a salary
and a bonus.
The Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID), (1976-91)
The sample consisted of white male
heads of households aged 18 to 64 with
positive earnings for the period spanning
the years 1976-91.12 Individuals in the
public sector and those who worked less
than 500 hours were excluded from the
analysis.  We know whether each worker
was paid a piece rate, a commission, an
hourly rate, or a salary.  One interesting
feature of the PSID for the 1976-91 period
is the fact that we were able to determine
whether a worker received a bonus during
the last year.  In the PSID questionnaire,
workers were asked the amount of money
they received from either working overtime,
or from commissions, or from bonuses
paid by the employer.  Given that workers
reported either their number of overtime
hours worked (or simply that they worked
overtime) as well as the hourly rate for
overtime, we were able to compute an esti-
mate of the amounts paid in bonuses.13
Computation of Bonuses from
PSID Data  
Variables V5285, V5784, V6393,
V6983, V7575, V8267, V8875, V10258,
V11399, V12798, V13900, V14915,
V16415, V17831, V19131, and V20431:
“Head’s income from bonuses, overtime,
and/or commissions.”  
Note that starting with interview year
1986, the codebook speciﬁes that the
values for this variable represented any
extra bonus, overtime and commissions
income not included in heads of
household's income from wages and
salaries during the preceding calendar year.
Therefore, it is possible that some  workers
who actually received a bonus from their
employer did not report it separately from
their usual. income.
Variables V5419, V5906, V6517, V7120,
V7743, V8405, V9036, and V10563:  “Did
you work any overtime which isn’t reported in
[average hours per week worked last year]?”
Variables V11142, V12541, V13741,
V14831, V16331, V17740, V19044, and
V20340:  “The values for this variable [...]
represent the annual overtime hours
worked on all main jobs, if reported sepa-
rately from regular work hours.” 
Variables V4515, V5426, V5913,
V6524, V7127, V7720, V8388, V9019,
V10468, V11659, V13062, V14162,
V15170, V16671, V18109, V19409:  
“How is that?  Neither salaried nor paid
hourly.”
This question refers to the method of
pay where the respondent was paid neither
a straight salary nor an hourly rate.  From
this question, we were able to identify
those workers paid commissions or a base
salary plus commissions. 
Variables V10465, V11656, V13059,
V14159, V15167, V16668, V18106,
V19406:  This is the overtime hourly rate
for salaried workers.
Variables V10467, V11658, V13061,
V14161, V15169, V16670, V18108,
V19408:  This is the overtime hourly rate
for hourly paid workers.
Variables V10469, V11660, V13063,
V14163, V15171, V16672, V18110,
12In the PSID, data on hours
worked during year t, as well
as on total labor earnings,
bonuses/commissions/over-
time income, and overtime
hours, are asked at the year
t+1  interview. Thus, we actu-
ally use data covering interview
years 1976-92.
13Since we cannot separately
identify the amount of income
derived exclusively par from
commissions, we have to
remove these workers from the
calculations.  Note that remov-
ing all negative estimates of
the bonuses probably biases the
par mean bonus paid upward.
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% Paid BonusesV19410:  This is the overtime hourly rate
for workers not paid either a salary or an
hourly rate.
Since no information on overtime
hours is available before 1984, we could not
compute an estimate of overtime income
for the years 1976-83.  Thus, we simply
deleted from the sample all workers who
report working overtime between 1976 and
1983 and those who report positive hours
of overtime work between 1984 and 1991.14
We also deleted commission workers.
It is worth repeating that we may have
a noisy measure of bonuses paid.  The reason
is that the questions on overtime are not
clear cut because workers were NOT asked
to report any overtime activity during the
previous calendar year.  Instead, they were
asked to report all overtime work not already
included in the usual hours per-week worked.
Measures of Local Labor Market Con-
ditions. From the beginning of the PSID
to interview year 1989, questionnaires were
sent to state employment ofﬁces asking
about current labor market conditions in
these counties.  Speciﬁcally, the unemploy-
ment rate measure refers to a speciﬁc period
during the corresponding interview year.
For interview year 1976, the reference
month is August; for interview years 1977-
79, it is November; for interview years
1981 and 1983, it is December, while for
interview years, 1982, 1984-88, it is
September.
Starting with interview year 1990, they
replaced the variables about the availability
of unskilled jobs and unemployment rates
with the average annual unemployment
rates for the respondents’ counties for the
calendar year prior to the interview.  These
ﬁgures come from the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) Local Area Unemployment
Statistics Program.  The industry (1 digit)
level unemployment rate series also comes
from the BLS.
14Restricting the sample to 1984-
91 and using the amount earned
in overtime to compute bonus-
es does not change the results,
apart from the standard errors.
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